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The essay by Guillory appears to rest on an essential distinction between natural and
historical time, correlated with the absence or centrality of reversible monument/doc-
uments (a concept taken over from Panofsky), where the sciences inhabit natural time
(devoid of monuments/documents) and the humanities inhabit historical time (in
which all its objects are monuments/documents). How though is this distinction to
be maintained in the face of decades of evidence and arguments from both science
and philosophy that would break it down? Bauman credits Panofsky with a strong be-
lief that historical time unites science and the humanities, whence it follows that both
scientiﬁc and humanistic disciplines deal with monuments and documents—a unity
that may be masked by an idealized vision of science as an ahistorical conveyor belt of
endless progress.J
ohn Guillory has written an essay that on the face of it seems straightforward but
interweaves multiple arguments in an intricate way. One could easily imagine
him devoting an entire book to the theme. To manage it in under ten thousand
words is quite a feat, but also increases the risk of misconstruing his intentions. So I
shall start by summarizing what I take Guillory to be saying.
He wants to fend off assaults on humanities disciplines by asserting that “the human-
ities” constitutes a uniﬁed discipline, rather than a ragtag administrative assemblage of
ﬁelds that happen not to be sciences. To ground that assertion he looks to the writings of
Erwin Panofsky, particularly his 1938 essay “The History of Art as a Humanistic Disci-
pline,” the main lines of which Guillory carries over into his own essay.1 Guillory sets a
high bar for his undertaking: “Panofsky’s meditation on the disciplinary object disclosesry of Humanities, Volume 1, Number 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/685057
16 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 2379-3163/2016/0101-0003$10.00
. Erwin Panofsky, “The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline,” in The Meaning of the Hu-
ties: Five Essays by Ralph Barton Perry, August Charles Krey, Erwin Panofsky, Robert Lowry Cal-
, Gilbert Chinard, ed. Theodore Meyer Greene, 2nd ed. (1938; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
, 1940), 89–118.
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32 | H ISTORY OF HUMANIT IES S PR I NG 2 0 1 6a coherence that organizes the disciplines [of the humanities] according to a logic far
more credible than that of convenience. If we cannot give an account of this coherence,
there can be no credible basis for a defense of the humanities generally, as opposed to
the individual disciplines collected under this category.” The coherence disclosed by
Panofsky and reprised by Guillory is that all the objects of study of all humanities dis-
ciplines exist within historical time rather than in the natural time that all the objects
of study of science occupy. Historical time is itself a cultural artifact, characterized by
how all its objects are reversibly monuments and documents. Which of the two they
present themselves as to a humanist will depend on the perspective of our particular
humanistic discipline. Guillory stresses that they come to us “given” as an object of
study, unlike the objects of study of the sciences, which, because they exist in natural time,
do not possess “monumentality” or “documentality,” and get created by themethod(ology)
the scientist adopts, in conjunction with instruments that serve the method.
In addition, the constructedness of historical time means that it extends into “long
time,” beyond the lifetime of any individual. It is here that monuments become crucial
as stopping points for what would otherwise be an endless stream of phenomena. Doc-
uments accompany them over long time, providing the backup for their monumental-
ity—something that would be trivial or even unnecessary in natural time.
Anymisrepresentations in this summary are not purposeful but result frommy lim-
ited knowledge of Panofsky, whose many-faceted work I know mostly through its re-
lation to others who have ﬁgured more directly in my own studies (Peirce, Cassirer,
Morris, Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu, Kuhn, et al.). Unlike Benjamin Jowett (who was
not so arrogant as Guillory characterizes him), I am quite ready to apologize. As I un-
derstand Panofsky’s view, two interlinked questions arise concerning Guillory’s appro-
priation of it. They involve how we read Panofsky’s conceptual monument after the ac-
cretions of three-quarters of a century and whether his own use of it (as interpretable
from the “documental” record) is reconcilable with what Guillory is suggesting.
The dichotomy between natural time and historical time ﬁgured prominently in
Panofsky’s writings already in the 1920s and had its sources in Simmel’s The Problem
of Historical Time and Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.2 Before that, Bergson’s
distinction between temps and durée had made its way into general awareness.3 Cas-2. Georg Simmel, Das Problem der historischen Zeit (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1916); Ernst Cas-
sirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 3 vols. (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1923–29). Simmel’s book
appeared in a series codirected by Cassirer.
3. Bergson’s work in this area went back to his doctoral thesis, Essai sur les données immédiates de
la conscience (1889; published in English as Time and Free Will: Essay on the Immediate Data of Con-
sciousness, trans. F. L. Pogson [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1910]), but it was with the success of
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to bring the philosophical considerations to bear on the very practical problem of dat-
ing artistic “monuments,” making Simmel’s and Cassirer’s concepts real and familiar
to an audience whose theoretical interests had their limits. By 1938, the basic notion of
the relativity of time and space had made inroads into general culture. Whorf, writing
in the same years about Hopi time—how the Hopi language constructs the passage
of time differently from what Whorf called the “Standard Average European” lan-
guages—could reference certain monuments of quantum physics knowing that his
audience would catch them.4 Whorf ’s own knowledge of them may have come less
from his engineering studies at MIT than from his lifelong engagement with Theoso-
phy, a widespread movement dedicated to reconciling scientiﬁc and humanistic per-
spectives with religion, not in the form of any particular sectarian creed but a set of
universal religious principles distilled from Buddhism by the movement’s founder,
Madame Blavatsky.5
This was also the high period of the Unity of Science movement, led by Rudolf
Carnap together with his young University of Chicago colleague Charles Morris, the
key ﬁgure in modern Peircean semiotics. Morris’s Foundations of the Theory of Signs
(1938) was aimed at reconciling the sciences and humanities (though not religion),
based on the perception that they were divided by the use of different semiotic sys-
tems—in effect, distinct languages.6 Interestingly, in the context of Guillory’s essay,
within the humanities Morris’s book was received as a hostile assault: the second issue
of the Kenyon Review, the organ of the ﬂedgling New Criticism, devoted considerable
space to defending itself against what it saw as an attempt by science to usurp the hu-
manities’ territory.7 Morris quickly replied that this was not his intention at all: rather,
it was to delimit three separate conceptual and semiotic spheres for the arts, science,4. BenjaminLeeWhorf, “TheRelation ofHabitual Thought andBehavior to Language” (1939), inLan-
guage, Culture and Personality: Essays in Memory of Edward Sapir, ed. Leslie Spier (Menasha, WI: Sapir
Memorial Publication Fund, 1941), 75–93, and reprinted inLanguage, Thought, andReality: SelectedWrit-
ings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, ed. John B. Carroll, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956), 134–59.
5. See John E. Joseph, From Whitney to Chomsky: Essays in the History of American Linguistics
(Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2002), 93–99.
6. Charles W. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs, International Encyclopedia of Uniﬁed
Science, ed. Otto Neurath, vol. 1, no. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).
7. Eliseo Vivas, Howard Dykema Roelofs, and Philip Blair Rice, “The New Encyclopedists: A Sym-
posium,” Kenyon Review 1, no. 2 (1939): 159–82; John Crowe Ransom, “Editorial Notes: The Arts and
the Philosophers,” Kenyon Review 1, no. 2 (1939): 194–99.
L’Évolution créatrice (1907; published in English as Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell [Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1911]) that he became internationally known and his earlier works were widely trans-
lated.
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34 | H ISTORY OF HUMANIT IES S PR I NG 2 0 1 6and technology.8 This appears to have paciﬁed the New Critics, whose concern lay not
with lack of uniﬁcation but with disciplinary autonomy.
Guillory has staked out a position comparable to that of the New Critics insofar as
he wants to see the humanities treated as on a par with the sciences rather than sub-
jugated to them (though in his case the feared subjugation is more ﬁnancial and ad-
ministrative than intellectual). Unlike them, he is concerned with unifying, not sci-
ence and religion like the Theosophists, nor science and the humanities like the logical
positivists, but just the humanities, internally. In the post-Saussurean spirit of value-
generated-by-difference, Guillory tries to achieve internal unity in part by maximizing
the contrast with the sciences, and uses Panofsky to that end, by making the distinc-
tion between historical and natural time into the anchor for a deﬁning division be-
tween the two areas of academic endeavor.
The documental trail does not suggest that this is a faithful use of how Panofsky
himself viewed the monument he created—not that it needs to be. It is perfectly legit-
imate to adapt a theory or model to some other end than the one for which it is created,
though it is helpful to make clear that one is doing so. Whereas Guillory is striving to
increase the distance between the sciences and humanities, Johanna Bauman has writ-
ten concerning Panofsky that “the attempt to reconcile the polarization of knowledge
between theNaturwissenschaften (natural sciences) and the Geisteswissenschaften (cul-
tural sciences or humanities), making possible a greater understanding of human cul-
ture . . . is one of the central points of ‘The History of Art as a Humanistic Disci-
pline.’ ”9 That would place Panofsky in the spirit of the Unity of Science program
and the International Encylopedia of Uniﬁed Science project that debuted in the same
year as Panofsky’s essay.10 Other documental evidence for his intentions come from
his disciple Edgar Wind, notably Wind’s essay “Some Points of Contact between History
and the Natural Sciences” (1936), in which, as Bauman puts it, “Wind effects a formal
comparison between the methodologies of history and the natural sciences, leading him
to conclude that both are objects of human knowledge and experience. Betraying his8. Charles W. Morris, “Science, Art and Technology,” Kenyon Review 1, no. 4 (1939): 409–23.
9. Johanna Bauman, translator’s note for Erwin Panofsky, “Reﬂections on Historical Time,” Critical
Inquiry 30 (2004): 693. Bauman points “for a discussion of the importance of this reconciliation” to
Michael Ann Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1984), 213–20; and Sylvia Feretti, Cassirer, Panofsky, and Warburg: Symbol, Art, and History, trans.
Richard Pierce (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 142–47.
10. The program began with Rudolf Carnap’s The Unity of Science (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner & Co., 1934). The encyclopedia, a planned series of books of which many though not all even-
tually appeared, was initiated with vols. 1–2 of the International Encyclopedia of Uniﬁed Science,
Foundations of the Unity of Science, ed. Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and Charles W. Morris
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938–39).
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observing subject, whose intervention contributes to the ﬁnal interpretation of data.”11
Herein lies the main obstacle to Guillory’s attempt to recruit Panofsky for his strategic
purposes: humanities and sciences are equally bound to the observing subject’s inter-
pretative choices, despite whatever methods they may devise for limiting (or simply
denying) them. This dependency has meant as well that the dichotomy between natural
time and historical time has never been epistemologically robust. By the late 1930s Pa-
nofsky cannot have failed to know that it was no longer sound, having lost all purchase
in physics, wearing away in philosophy under pressure from phenomenologists, but still
with just enough of a leg to stand on for his art-historical purposes, so long as his readers
understood natural time as what Augustine meant when he said that he knows what time
is until someone asks him to deﬁne it.
By the end of the twentieth century, within the humanities, concepts such as nat-
ural time had collapsed along with other essentialized divisions between the natural
and the human—as if what human beings produce is somehow excluded from the
realm of nature, and as if the realm of nature is not itself always the product of human
conception. As Mary Catherine Bateson put it, with sublime pithiness, “Everything is
natural.”12 If I understand correctly that Guillory would locate the coherence that or-
ganizes the humanities into a uniﬁed discipline in
• an essential distinction between natural and historical time, correlated with
• the absence or centrality of reversible monument/documents, where
• the sciences inhabit natural time (devoid of monuments/documents) and the
humanities inhabit historical time (in which all its objects are monuments/
documents),
then I want to know how he will maintain this distinction in the face of decades of
evidence and arguments from both science and philosophy that would break it down.11. Bauman, translator’s note; Edgar Wind, “Some Points of Contact between History and the Nat-
ural Sciences,” in Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer, ed. Raymond Klibansky
and H. J. Paton (Oxford: Clarendon; London: Milford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), 255–
64. OnWind and Panofsky, see also Tullio Viola, “Peirce and Iconology: Habitus, Embodiment and the
Analogy between Philosophy and Architecture,” European Journal of Pragmatism and American Phi-
losophy 4, no. 1 (2012): 6–31.
12. Mary Catherine Bateson, “On the Naturalness of Things,” In How Things Are: A Science Tool-
Kit for the Mind, ed. John Brockman and Katinka Matson (New York: Morrow; London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1995), 10. See also John E. Joseph, “The Natural: Its Meanings and Functions in the History
of Linguistic Thought,” in History of Linguistics 2005: Papers from the Tenth International Conference
on the History of the Language Sciences (ICHoLS X), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2–5
Sep. 2005, ed. Douglas A. Kibbee (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2007), 1–23.
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unites science and the humanities, whence it follows that both scientiﬁc and human-
istic disciplines can and do deal with monuments and documents—as seems obvious,
so long as one is not bound to some idealized vision of science as an ahistorical con-
veyor belt of endless progress. Some of the monuments/documents of either science or
the humanities may get historicized as “natural”; both ﬁelds may use instruments,
which never speak for themselves but always require interpretation—in their design,
construction, implementation, and above all in the handling of the data they supply.
Our debate must not of course leave aside the achievements of the history of sci-
ence over the last half-century. A conception of science as having objects of study
that transcend historical time would be pre-Kuhnian, and, as I have suggested, pre-
Panofskyan.13 It would be as though Latour had never shown how the polarization of
Nature versus Subject/Society became the deﬁning characteristic of the “modern”
age—and that such a polarization is in fact unsustainable, whence his conclusion that
“we have never been modern” and his striving over decades to realize a uniﬁed, sym-
metrical approach to the natural and the historical.14
In the present context it bears registering, for documental purposes, that I do not
accept the framing premise of Guillory’s article, about the humanities being under “as-
sault.” This is not my experience. In the United Kingdom, cries of complaint are heard
from the older and newer ends of the university spectrum: Oxford and Cambridge,
used to behaving like medieval guilds and screaming bloody murder at any attempt
by governments to make them either socially responsible in their recruitment and
treatment of students or accountable for the vast amounts of public money they are
allocated; and “new” universities, former polytechnics, and other institutions often
with long distinguished histories of training people in practical occupations, which
starting in the 1960s were dragged into an ideology that no institution of higher learn-
ing had a right to exist unless it offered courses in the humanities. If some of these have
subsequently decided internally to reduce their humanities provision and reassert the
worthiness of the subject areas in which their traditional strengths lie, surely that is
something a humanist worthy of the name ought to support, while of course sympa-
thizing with those teaching in the subjects that are cut back.13. The conjunction of Kuhn and Panofsky makes it impossible to omit mention of Ernst
Gombrich, the art historian who formulated the notion of “paradigm” more or less simultaneously
with Kuhn, in Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (London: Phaidon;
New York: Pantheon, 1960).
14. Bruno Latour, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes: Essai d’anthropologie symétrique (Paris: La
Découverte, 1991), published in English as We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
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speak of an American university system bleaches the word “system” of meaning), and
the humanities have been subjected to cutbacks of various kinds in various places. But
this does not automatically guarantee that Guillory is right to assume that attempts to
defend the humanities based on their general value have failed. People reading his ar-
ticle ﬁfty years from now may get the impression that he wrote it under siege, as bar-
barian politicians and philistine scientists stormed his SoHo ofﬁce block. In fact the
sector seems to be faring well at New York University, where the Center for the Hu-
manities “is generously supported by funding from the Ofﬁce of the Provost at NYU
and an endowment from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation,” and it is heartening to
see that its advisory board includes a professor of pediatrics, along with the codirector
of the Science and Technology Studies Program in the University’s Polytechnic School
of Engineering.15 This suggests the sort of depolarization that, from a Latourian per-
spective, offers a genuine way forward, rather than regression.
The criterion set by Guillory for the success of his endeavor is, again, that “if we
cannot give an account of this coherence, there can be no credible basis for a defense
of the humanities generally, as opposed to the individual disciplines.” Fortunately, this
is a false premise: the values-based defenses of the humanities that Guillory rejects de-
ﬁne a more credible coherence than the one he offers; they have been a failure only if
the benchmark for success is universal celebration and support, or at least as much
support as the sciences receive. Not that it isn’t a good idea to challenge the status
quo, at least as a thought experiment; a case in point is Wallerstein’s brilliant reimag-
ining of the social sciences, abolishing existing subject areas and regrouping those who
inhabit them (whether they do sociology, anthropology, or whatever) into three new
departments of nomothetics (general laws), ideographics (particular cases), and grand
narratives, since “the social construction of the disciplines as intellectual arenas that
was made in the 19th century has outlived its usefulness and is today a major obstacle
to serious intellectual work.”16
Wallerstein is not trying to project an illusion of coherence by ﬁtting all these dis-
ciplines into a Procrustean bed, as Guillory does when he ignores all those core human-
ities areas—theoretical linguistics, for example, or systematic musicology—in which
monuments and documents ﬁgure no differently than they do in chemistry or surgery.
He could handle such cases by restricting the humanities to just those approaches that15. Information from http://nyuhumanities.org/advisory-board/.
16. Immanuel Wallerstein, “Anthropology, Sociology, and Other Dubious Disciplines,” Current
Anthropology 44 (2003): 454.
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more ﬁrmly in the role of Procrustes than his taciturnity does.
Both Wallerstein and Guillory are troubled by the limits created by the fences be-
tween ﬁelds, butWallerstein recognizes that the variety within each ﬁeld provides a cre-
ative tension that helps to keep any of the camps from settling into a self-satisﬁed com-
fort zone. He also has the academic nous to envision the imagined reorganization from
the point of view not just of a scholar and teacher but also that of a university admin-
istrator, someone whomay well be a scholar from within the ﬁeld, who shares its values
so strongly that he or she has taken on the challenge of saving the institution from ﬁ-
nancial collapse. I am not an administrator, just because I would not wish to be in their
shoes, but I wonder whether a provost tasked with cutting costs lest the university go
under might not ﬁnd an essay asserting the deep coherence of the humanities useful
when pitching the merger of a dozen departments of art history, history, modern lan-
guages and literatures, philosophy, music, and so on, into a single department of hu-
manities. If the professor of moral philosophy and the professor of ﬁlm studies are fun-
damentally doing the same thing, do we really need to replace the former when he or
she retires, especially since the latter attracts more students?
Guillory’s thought-provoking essay has convinced me that those hoping to defend
the humanities would do best to focus on their particular disciplines, while not giving
up the values-based general defenses that have kept the humanities not only alive but
in many respects more diverse and vibrant than at any previous time in history. This is
not to say that we have nothing to learn by looking to Panofsky and his contemporar-
ies for guidance, but guidance on the reconciliation they valued, rather than rearguard
defensive tactics.WORKS CITED
Bateson, Mary Catherine. 1995. “On the Naturalness of Things.” In How Things Are: A Sci-
ence Tool-Kit for the Mind, edited by John Brockman and Katinka Matson, 9–16. New
York: Morrow; London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Bauman, Johanna. 2004. Translator’s note for Erwin Panofsky’s “Reﬂections on Historical
Time.” Critical Inquiry 30:691–701.
Bergson, Henri. (1889) 1910. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Paris: Félix
Alcan. Published in English as Time and Free Will: Essay on the Immediate Data of Con-
sciousness. Translated by F. L. Pogson. London: Allen & Unwin.
———. (1907) 1911. L’Évolution créatrice. Published in English as Creative Evolution.
Translated by Arthur Mitchell. London: Macmillan.
Carnap, Rudolf. 1934. The Unity of Science. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
Cassirer, Ernst. 1923–29. Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. 3 vols. Berlin: Cassirer.This content downloaded from 129.215.052.204 on April 05, 2016 07:33:05 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
F
O
R
U
M
A RE P L Y TO JOHN GU I L LORY | 39Feretti, Sylvia. 1989. Cassirer, Panofsky, and Warburg: Symbol, Art, and History. Translated
by Richard Pierce. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Holly, Michael Ann. 1984. Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History. Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press.
Gombrich, Ernst. 1960. Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representa-
tion. London: Phaidon; New York: Pantheon.
———. 2002. From Whitney to Chomsky: Essays in the History of American Linguistics.
Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Joseph, John E. 2007. “The Natural: Its Meanings and Functions in the History of Linguistic
Thought.” In History of Linguistics 2005: Papers from the Tenth International Conference
on the History of the Language Sciences (ICHoLS X), University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, 2–5 Sep. 2005, edited by Douglas A. Kibbee, 1–23. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Latour, Bruno. (1991) 1993. Nous n’avons jamais été modernes: Essai d’anthropologie
symétrique. Paris: La Découverte, ). Published in English as We Have Never Been Mod-
ern. Translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Morris, Charles W. 1938. “Foundations of the Theory of Signs.” In International Encyclo-
pedia of Uniﬁed Science, vols. 1–2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1939. “Science, Art and Technology.” Kenyon Review 1 (4): 409–23.
Neurath, Otto, Rudolf Carnap, and Charles W. Morris, eds. 1938–39. International Ency-
clopedia of Uniﬁed Science. Vols. 1–2: Foundations of the Unity of Science. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Panofsky, Erwin. (1938) 1940. “The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline.” In The
Meaning of the Humanities: Five Essays by Ralph Barton Perry, August Charles Krey,
Erwin Panofsky, Robert Lowry Calhoun, Gilbert Chinard, edited by Theodore Meyer
Greene, 89–118. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ransom, John Crowe. 1939. “Editorial Notes: The Arts and the Philosophers.” Kenyon Re-
view 1 (2): 194–99.
Simmel, Georg. 1916. Das Problem der historischen Zeit. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard.
Viola, Tullio. 2012. “Peirce and Iconology: Habitus, Embodiment and the Analogy between
Philosophy and Architecture.” European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philos-
ophy 4 (1): 6–31.
Vivas, Eliseo, Howard Dykema Roelofs, and Philip Blair Rice. 1939. “The New Encyclope-
dists: A Symposium.” Kenyon Review 1 (2): 159–82
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2003. “Anthropology, Sociology, and Other Dubious Disciplines.”
Current Anthropology 44:453–65.
Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1941. “The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Lan-
guage.” In Language, Culture and Personality: Essays in Memory of Edward Sapir, edited
by Leslie Spier, 75–93. Menasha, WI: Sapir Memorial Publication Fund. Reprinted in
Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, edited by
John B. Carroll, 134–59. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956.
Wind, Edgar. 1936. “Some Points of Contact between History and the Natural Sciences.”
In Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer, edited by Raymond Kli-
bansky and H. J. Paton, 255–264. Oxford: Clarendon; London: Milford; New York: Ox-
ford University Press.This content downloaded from 129.215.052.204 on April 05, 2016 07:33:05 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
